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Abstract 
 
Network structures constrain and enable political actors. Nonetheless, few models of 
decision making in international politics take network relations into account. We 
formulate and test a network model of decision making that incorporates the influence 
relations among political decision makers. In the first stage of the model, decision 
makers influence each other’s initial policy positions on controversial issues through 
their network relations. The extent to which this influence leads to changes in decision 
makers’ initial policy positions depends on the presence of network ties with other 
actors and the relative salience of the issue to the decision makers. In the second stage 
of the model, decision makers take a decision on the basis of their revised policy 
positions. The dataset we use to test the model combines information on the network 
relations among the member states’ representations to the EU and decision-making 
actors’ initial policy positions on controversial issues. The network model generates 
more accurate predictions of decision outcomes on these issues than does an 
appropriate baseline model. We draw out the implications of our findings for 
understanding the role of network relations in international politics. 
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A Network Model of Decision Making Applied to the European Union 
 
 
Collective decision making in many political systems can be characterized as an 
influence stage followed by a decision stage. During the influence stage, the action is 
dominated by informal contacts among decision makers, and perhaps also actors 
without formal decision power. In the decision stage, decision makers must reach a 
decision outcome, either by voting or some other way of aggregating their policy 
positions. Achen notes that this general two-stage conception has been shared by a 
broad range of studies, including the work of Bentley.1 Stokman and Van den Bos 
formalized this conception in a two-stage model of policymaking that they applied to 
domestic policymaking.2 It is this model that we adapt in the present study.  
 Actors’ informal contacts with one another, which structure the influence 
stage, are conceived of as network relations. The present study draws on an approach 
to studying networks that was developed in quantitative sociology. Social network 
analysis is a branch of quantitative sociology that offers a rich set of concepts and 
techniques with which to study social interactions.3 Political scientists have made 
extensive use of social network analysis when examining the interactions among 
political actors in various national arenas.4 Social network analysis has also 
increasingly been applied to international relations. Traditionally, IR scholars have 
                                   
1 Achen 2006a, 86; Bentley 1967[1908]. 
2 Stokman and Van den Bos 1992. 
3 Wasserman and Faust 1994; Carrington et al. eds. 2005. 
4 Laumann and Knoke 1987; Heinz et al. 1993; Knoke et al. 1996; for a review see Thatcher 
1998. 
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perceived and analyzed networks as a distinct mode of organization, somewhere 
between markets and states. The perspective of social network analysis has enabled 
scholars to examine networks rigorously and to ask a broad set of questions about 
them.5 Networks here consist of patterns of inter-relational ties between actors. These 
patterns form structures, which in turn constrain and enable actors. Actors’ 
preferences, behavior and powers are not only functions of their individual attributes 
and material capabilities, but also of their network relations. The structure of the 
network therefore affects policy outcomes.  
The present study shares the focus of social network analysis on the interplay 
between network relations, actors and policy outcomes. The empirical focus here is 
decision making in the European Union (EU) on a broad selection of legislative 
proposals from the period 1996-2008. We study a time period in which the EU 
enlarged from fifteen to twenty-five and then twenty-seven member states. This 
enlargement is the culmination of one of the most important series of events in recent 
European history. We examine the stage of decision making between the introduction 
of the legislative proposal and the adoption of the final legislative act. After the 
introduction of the legislative proposal, the main actors involved are the actors with 
formal decision power. In the EU these actors are the European Commission, the 
member states in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. While there 
are many models of decision making in international politics, network relations have 
generally not featured prominently in them. For example, a recent survey and 
comparative test of models of decision making in the European Union did not contain 
a single model that featured network relations.6 One class of models of decision 
                                   
5 Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery forthcoming. 
6 Thomson et al. eds. 2006. 
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making, so-called procedural models, seeks to elucidate the ways in which formal 
rules of decision making impact on the final decision outcomes taken.7 These models 
focus on the implications of decision rules such as which actors can introduce 
proposals, which actors can amend proposals, and the levels of support required for 
those amendments to be carried. Bargaining models, by contrast, focus on the 
informal norms that constrain actors during negotiation.8 The network model 
elaborated in the present study is clearly closest to the bargaining models with its 
emphasis on the informal constraints on actors’ abilities to exert influence. However, 
unlike the network model presented here, most current models of decision making do 
not incorporate network relations but assume, at least implicitly, that decision makers 
have equal access to each other.  
In line with previous research, we test the accuracy of the network model’s 
predictions of decision outcomes against the predictions of an appropriate baseline 
model, which in this case is the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). The Nash 
Bargaining Solution is a compromise model that takes the positions of all actors into 
account. In previous research this model prove to be a formidable competitor to 
supposedly more sophisticated models and therefore constitutes a tough test for the 
network model. The breadth of our empirical focus also allows us to examine whether 
networks have more impact under certain conditions, depending on the decision 
making procedure, the character of the policy area and the number and heterogeneity 
of member states involved. The importance of taking network relations into account is 
demonstrated by our finding that across a broad range of issues—although the 
                                   
7 For example, Tsebelis and Garrett 2000. 
8 For example, Achen 2006a; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman eds. 2004. 
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differences between the models predictions are fairly small—the network model’s 
predictions are significantly more accurate than those of the NBS model.  
 
  
The Network Model and a Baseline Model 
 
Social network analysis focuses on relational ties between units, which may be 
individual or collective actors. The network model developed here conceives of 
network relations as enduring relationships among individuals from different 
collective actors. In these relationships, individuals exert influence on other actors 
with a view to affecting their policy positions and eventually decision outcomes. 
 The network model is general in that sense that it is compatible with a range of 
ways in which actors interact with one another. The information actors share may 
include the policy outcomes they favor most, the intensity of their preferences, and 
normative justifications for their policy positions. The political strategies actors may 
implement in their network relations may be based on a range of modes of interaction. 
Some strategies may be based on highly cooperative modes of interaction, such as 
those based on exchange of control or voting positions on different issues.9  
Cooperative modes of interaction also include coalition building among actors with 
similar interests.10 Other strategies may be based on non-cooperative modes of 
interaction, whereby an actor may compel other actors to adopt different policy 
positions to those they initially favored.11 Alternatively, actors may attempt to change 
                                   
9 Coleman 1990; Stokman and Van Oosten 2004. 
10 Axelrod 1970; Van Deemen 1997. 
11 Bueno de Mesquita 1994. 
 4 
the policy preferences of other actors by discussion on merits, thereby shifting 
emphasis from actors’ power resources to the force of their arguments.12 Persuasion 
may be cooperative (as in deliberation or communicative action) or competitive 
(rhetorical action).13 The network model assumes that each actor attempts to shift 
other actors’ policy positions toward its own policy position, and that all actors are 
open to at least some influence from other actors. While the network model is 
compatible with different modes of interaction, we believe that in the EU the 
prevailing norms of consensus-seeking behavior are more congruent with cooperative 
modes of interaction and the use of argumentation. Actors in the EU are embedded in 
a situation where there is a long shadow of the future, which tends to support 
conciliatory and cooperative behavior.  
 The main constraints on the extent to which an actor (ego) can influence the 
policy position taken by another actor (alter) is whether a network relation exists that 
connects the actor (ego) to that other actor (alter). We conceive of these relationships 
as relatively stable and enduring social structures. The data we use on networks 
among member state representatives in the European Union confirm that our 
conception of networks as stable structures is appropriate in this context. The 
networks are remarkably stable over time and across policy areas.14 The strength of 
the network relationships is not a variable we seek to explain in our model; instead, 
                                   
12 Risse 2000; on discussion on the merits see Barry 1965, 87. 
13 AUTHOR; on deliberation see Gutmann and Thompson 1996; on rhetorical action see 
Schimmelfennig 2001, 63. 
14 Naurin 2007. 
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the model focuses on the impact of the network on the development of actors’ policy 
positions and consequently decision outcomes.15 
 Our network model, as applied to the EU’s legislative process, consists of the 
following two stages. The first stage begins when member state representatives and 
the European Parliament (EP) receive a legislative proposal from the European 
Commission. Member state representatives consult with their respective 
constituencies to identify the decision outcomes they would favor most on the policy 
issues raised by the legislative proposal. This results in each actor taking at least a 
tentative initial position on each policy issue at time t1. Subsequently, member state 
representatives influence one another through their network relations. A member 
state’s initial policy position at time t1 is then influenced by the policy positions of 
other member states to which it grants access. A first member state is more influenced 
by a second member state if the first has a network tie with the second state, and if the 
second state attaches more importance to the issue than does the first state. This 
influence round may result in changes to a state’s initial position. After the influence 
round, member states have a new position at time t2.  
 The actors then enter the second stage or the decision stage, in which their 
revised policy positions are transformed into a decision outcome (or set of outcomes) 
that is binding for all. In the decision stage of the model, a forecast of the decision 
                                   
15 Some studies seek to explain the formation and dynamics of network relationships. From a 
rationalist perspective, some models of network formation posit that actors seek and grant 
access to others with a view to exerting maximal influence: for example, Stokman and 
Zeggelink 1996; Stokman and Berveling 1998. From a social-psychological perspective, 
strong network relations may also be engendered by group affinity based on perceptions of 
‘we’ and ‘others’: for example, AUTHOR, Brewer and Brown 1998. 
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outcome is generated based on member states’ revised policy positions. Depending on 
the decision rule that applies, the positions of the European Commission and the 
European Parliament are also taken into account at the decision stage. Under the 
consultation procedure, the policy positions of only the Commission and the member 
states affect the decision outcomes; the EP gives only a non-binding opinion. Under 
the codecision procedure, the policy positions of only the EP and the member states 
affect the decision outcomes; the Commission does not formally play a role in 
determining the decision outcomes under the codecision procedure. Both the 
consultation and codecision procedures can be combined with the requirement of 
unanimity in the Council for a bill to pass or qualified majority voting (QMV) in the 
Council, a form of supermajority voting. 
 As with all models, this two-stage network model is of course a simplification 
of the reality of decision-making processes in general, and of decision making in the 
complex system of the EU in particular. For instance, the model does not include 
relations between public and private actors, which have been the subject of much 
previous policy network research.16 Nonetheless, interest groups are most likely to 
exert influence on the Commission, prior to its formulation of the legislative proposal, 
rather than the part of the policymaking process we examine in the present study. 
 In addition, our network model does not take into account the fact that 
member states’ initial policy positions, and not only their revised positions, may also 
be influenced by other member states through the network relations in which they are 
embedded. Indeed, in other political systems, actors have been found to consult with 
each other before formulating their initial policy positions.17 In the EU, it is 
                                   
16 Knoke et al. 1996, 6. 
17 Jones 2001, 102; Kollman 1998, 103; Laumann and Knoke 1987, 206. 
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reasonable to assume that member state representatives in Brussels first consult with 
their national capitals and domestic constituencies to form at least a tentative initial 
position before consulting with representatives from other member states.18 Given the 
structure of the data we observe, we believe this assumption is defendable. The 
networks we observe are stable across policy areas and over time. By contrast, there is 
considerable variation in actors’ initial positions.19 Member states that agree on one 
issue may disagree on another issue, even when the two issues are part of the same 
legislative proposal. To the extent that our assumption is incorrect, and networks do 
influence actors’ initial positions, our analyses underestimate the true policy impact of 
the networks. Also in this respect, therefore, the network model faces a tough test in 
this study. 
 The following sub-section gives a simple formalization of the network model. 
This clarifies the assumptions that we make in this study. The sub-section thereafter 
identifies the intuitively obvious baseline model with which to compare the network 
model; that is the Nash Bargaining Solution that does not incorporate network 
relations. 
 
Formalization of the Network Model 
 
The network model assumes that controversial issues can be represented as one-
dimensional policy scales on which actors take policy positions. Empirically, as will 
be discussed below, complex decisions can be represented as sets of related one-
dimensional policy scales. Each policy scale refers to a range of policy alternatives. 
                                   
18 Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, Chapter 9. 
19 AUTHOR. 
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The most extreme policy alternatives considered in a controversy are represented by 
the numbers 0 and 100, while intermediate policy alternatives are given numbers 
between 0 and 100 to represent their relative political distance to these extremes. As 
such, each policy scale represents the range of the bargaining space for each 
controversy. Actors, from the set of n actors, can be placed on each of these policy 
scales to represent the position they favor most at the outset of the negotiations. If 
there are n actors, let the decision outcome initially favored by actor i on issue a be 
denoted as positionia-t1.  
 Consider the position of actor j on issue a after the influence of the network in 
which actor j is embedded. The revised position of actor j (from the set of n actors), 
denoted positionja-t2, is given by the following formula. 
 
positionja-t2 = ∑
∑
=
= −
n
i iaij
n
i iaijtia
saliencenetwork
saliencenetworkposition
1
1 1  
 
Where 
positionia-t1 is the position of actor i (from the set of actors, n) on issue a at time t1 
(that is, before the influence stage) on the policy scale representing issue a. 
networkij is a dichotomous variable which indicates the presence of a network 
influence relation from actor i to actor j.  
salienceia is the level of salience actor i attaches to issue a.  
 
 Network relations are conceived of as asymmetrical. It is possible that a first 
actor has access to and therefore influences a second actor while the second actor does 
not have access to the first actor. This is a common assumption in other network 
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models. The network model also contains an assumption about the extent to which an 
actor’s own initial position influences its revised position. In other words, how much 
control does an actor have over itself? The model assumes that each actor has full 
access to itself, and sets the value of networkii to 1. An alternative, offered by 
Stokman and Van den Bos, is to calculate the amount of control an actor has over 
itself based on the power resources an actor has at its disposal relative to the power 
resources of other actors.20 Our solution is a simpler one, and avoids introducing 
additional information on actors’ capabilities into the influence part of the model. 
 The fact that the network model does not feature actors’ capabilities is 
appropriate since actors’ capabilities are likely to influence the presence of network 
relations through which they may influence other actors. In other words, actors are 
likely to grant access to other actors that have high levels of capabilities. In this 
respect, information on actors’ capabilities features in the model indirectly, through 
the impact that actors’ capabilities have on their network relations. This is reflected in 
the network data from the EU that we use.  Larger member states tend to have better 
access to other states than do smaller states, although there is also considerable 
variation that is not associated with size. 
 Issue salience is an important feature of the influence stage in the network 
model. A first actor is more influenced by a second actor with which it has an 
influence relation if that second actor attaches more salience to the issue in question. 
Issue salience refers to the intensity of actors’ policy preferences, a concept with a 
long pedigree in empirical political analysis.21 A high level of salience is what turns a 
potential to influence into actual influence, because an actor with a high level of 
                                   
20 Stokman and Van den Bos 1992, 231. 
21 Achen 2006a, 92. 
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salience will put its capabilities into effect in pursuit of its policy position. Salience, 
as detailed in the research design section, is measured on a scale from 0-100. A value 
of 0 indicates that the actor attaches no importance whatsoever to the issue. A value of 
100 indicates that the actor will use its full potential to influence the positions of other 
actors and the decision outcome. Issue salience also implies linkages between 
different issues. The level of salience an actor attaches to an issue is gauged by the 
importance of other issues that are under negotiation in the same arena. 
 The network model described here is a general model that could be applied to 
any political system. We will detail its specific application to the European Union in 
the next section. However, we note here that in our application of the model to the 
EU, we focus exclusively on the network relations among member state 
representatives in the Council of Ministers. We do not consider the relations involving 
the European Commission and the European Parliament or actors within those 
organizations. For the purposes of our model, the network relations involving the 
Commission and the EP have values of 0. 
 The second stage of the network model consists of the transformation of the 
revised policy positions into a decision outcome. The formula that predicts the 
decision outcome on issue a is:  
 
network model decision outcomea = ∑
∑
=
= −
n
i iaia
n
i iaiatia
salienceescapabiliti
salienceescapabilitiposition
1
1 2  
 
Where 
network model decision outcomea is the network model’s prediction of the decision 
outcome on issue a. 
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positionia-t2 is the position of actor i (from the set of actors, n) on issue a at time t2 
(that is, after the influence stage), as predicted by the network model. 
capabilitiesia denotes the capabilities of actor i on issue a.  
salienceia is the level of salience actor i attaches to issue a. 
 
 The network model’s prediction of the decision outcome, therefore, 
incorporates its predictions of shifts in actors’ positions. The prediction is simply the 
weighted average of the actors’ revised positions. The weights assigned to actors’ 
positions are the products of actors’ capabilities times the levels of salience they 
attach to an issue. As will be discussed in the following section, this is the 
compromise model or Nash Bargaining Solution applied to the revised positions, as 
predicted by the network model. 
 Actors’ capabilities are introduced into the network model during the decision 
stage, when they transform their revised positions into a decision outcome. 
Capabilities define actors’ potential to influence the contents of decision outcomes. 
Capabilities depend on the possession of a range of resources that could bolster 
influence.22 In the decision stage, actors’ formal weights in the final decision-making 
process are important and loom larger than during the influence stage. Consequently, 
as will be discussed below, we operationalize actors’ capabilities using an adjusted 
measure of actors’ voting power. Since voting power varies according to the 
procedure that applies to the decision, an actor’s voting power varies across issues. At 
the decision stage, whether or not a member state decides to exert its potential to 
influence depends on how salient the issue is to it. Therefore, issue salience also 
features in the decision stage of the network model. 
                                   
22 Bueno de Mesquita 2003, chapter 7. 
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 The Baseline Model 
 
The compromise model or Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is an appropriate baseline 
model against which to test the accuracy of the network model’s predictions of 
decision outcomes. As a formula the NBS prediction of the decision outcome is: 
 
Nash decision outcomea = ∑
∑
=
= −
n
i iaia
n
i iaiatia
salienceescapabiliti
salienceescapabilitiposition
1
1 1  
 
Where 
Nash outcomea is the compromise model/NBS’ prediction of the decision outcome on 
issue a. 
positionia-t1 is the position of actor i (from the set of actors, n) on issue a at time t1 
(that is, before the influence stage). 
capabilitiesia and salienceia are defined as above. 
 
 The compromise model was first proposed in this form by Van den Bos in his 
study of decision making in the Council of the European Community. When 
describing the decision-making process this model represents, he emphasized that it 
‘takes all positions of Member States into account, weighting these by the resources a 
Member State can apply during the negotiation and the importance each attaches to 
the decision at hand’.23 The compromise model is not concerned with the composition 
of actors’ capabilities. That is exogenous to the model. Rather, it is concerned with 
                                   
23 Van den Bos 1991, 176. 
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the transformation of actors’ positions into decision outcomes, and how the relative 
capabilities and levels of issue salience affect this transformation.  
 Achen improved the theoretical standing of the compromise model by drawing 
parallels between this model and the research traditions of institutional realism in 
political science and social action theory in sociology. He concluded that ‘[t]his 
sophisticatedly simple equation neatly summarises much of the previous century’s 
thought about political policy-making’.24 Moreover, Achen proved that if a certain 
condition is met, the compromise model is a first-order approximation of the famous 
Nash Bargaining Solution.25 Nash formulated the bargaining solution as an answer to 
the question of what each actor should get in a situation where they must collaborate 
for mutual benefit. Informally, the essence of Nash’s answer is that it is the decision 
outcome that minimizes the utility losses of the actors involved. Achen’s insight is 
that if the disagreement outcome is highly undesirable, the compromise model and the 
Nash Bargaining Solution are one and the same.  
It is clear that the disagreement outcome is generally highly undesirable in EU 
decision making, and therefore that the compromise model is an appropriate formula 
with which to represent the Nash Bargaining Solution in this context. Close observers 
of decision making in the EU know that negotiators go to great lengths to avoid 
breakdown in discussions, even when parts of the legislative proposal are unpopular. 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace refer to this as the imperative of making propositions 
‘yesable’.26 It is true that on certain controversial issues, including those studied in the 
dataset examined here, there are often member state representatives who would prefer 
                                   
24 Achen 2006a, 94. 
25 Nash 1950. 
26 Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, 303. 
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the so-called ‘reference point’. The reference point is the decision outcome that would 
prevail if no decision were taken. However, this reference point does not capture two 
very important negative consequences of a failure to agree. The first is that other, 
perhaps uncontroversial parts of the legislative proposal would be lost if no agreement 
were reached. The second is that breakdowns in the decision-making process are 
damaging to the long-term relationships among decision makers, a cost that is not 
worth bearing unless the stakes are extremely high. 
 In addition to having strong theoretical foundations, the compromise model or 
Nash Bargaining Solution has an impressive track record in predicting decision 
outcomes more accurately than supposedly more sophisticated models. The 
compromise model was tested against a range of rational choice institutionalist 
models of legislative decision making.27 None of the more complex models generated 
more accurate predictions than the compromise model, and most generated 
significantly less accurate predictions. In addition, Moravcsik suggests that landmark 
decisions in course of European integration can be understood using the framework of 
the Nash Bargaining Solution.28 In short, for theoretical and empirical reasons, the 
Nash Bargaining Solution is a formidable baseline model against which to test the 
predictions of the network model. The main limitation of the compromise model, 
however, is that although it often succeeds in predicting decision outcomes relatively 
well, it does not give much insight into the process leading up to those decisions. 
More sophisticated decision-making models are therefore required to provide more 
satisfying explanations of decision outcomes. The network model developed here is 
an attempt to do that. 
                                   
27 Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman eds. 1994; Thomson et al. eds. 2006. 
28 Moravcsik 1998, 498. 
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 Research Design 
 
The research design brings together two distinct sets of data on decision making in the 
EU that have previously been analyzed in isolation. The first subsection gives details 
of the information on the network relations among the member states. The second 
subsection summarizes the information on controversial issues, actors’ initial 
positions, issue salience and final decision outcomes.  
 
Network Relations  
  
Information on the network relations among member state representatives was 
obtained through a survey of officials from the representations of all member states.29 
The first set of interviews was held from February to March 2003, which yielded a 
complete dataset on the network relations in the EU-15. The second set of interviews 
was held from February to March 2006, which yielded a complete dataset on the 
network relations in the EU-25. The officials were selected from eleven working 
groups in the Council of the EU. Officials from higher and lower-level working 
groups were selected from groups on economic policy, internal market, agriculture, 
foreign and security policy, environment, and justice and home affairs. In order to 
facilitate comparisons over time the sample of working groups was kept as similar as 
possible in 2003 and 2006. Nine of the eleven working groups were the same in both 
                                   
29 More details of these data can be found in Naurin 2007; Naurin and Lindahl 2008. 
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interview rounds.30 The interviews were conducted by telephone. There was a high 
response rate in both rounds: 81 percent in 2003 and 84 percent in 2006. In total 130 
officials from all EU-15 member states were interviewed in the first round, and 231 
officials from all EU-25 member states were interviewed in the second round. 
 In both surveys, 2003 and 2006, the following question was asked:  
Which member states do you most often cooperate with within your working group, in 
order to develop a common position? 
On the basis of respondents’ answers to this question, we identify the network 
relations between member states. In this context, it is preferable to ask respondents 
with whom they cooperate, rather than by whom they are influenced. The network 
model is concerned specifically with influence that is exerted through personal 
contacts. The question posed focuses respondents’ attention on direct contacts with 
people from other member states in their working groups. 
                                   
30 The higher level working groups included were Coreper II and Coreper I (the ambassadors 
and the vice-ambassadors of the member states’ permanent representatives in Brussels), the 
Economic Policy Committee, the Special Committee on Agriculture, the Committee on 
Enlargement (2003 only) the Political and Security Committee and the Article 36 Committee 
(the latter dealing with judicial cooperation in the field of criminal matters, police 
cooperation, organized crime and terrorism, included in 2006 only). In cases a Coreper II or 
Coreper I ambassador was not available, their assistants were interviewed (who in EU-jargon 
are called the Antici- and Mertens-delegates respectively). The lower level working groups 
were the Politico-Military Working Party, the Working Party on Mashrek-Maghreb (2003 
only), the Working Party on Agricultural Questions, the Working Party on the Environment, 
the Working Party on Tax Questions and the Working Party on Competition and Growth 
(2006 only). 
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 In answer to this question, respondents listed the member states they 
cooperated with most often. In the present study, we assume that an ego member state 
is influenced by an alter member state if at least one official from the ego state 
mentions the alter state as a cooperation partner. Naurin and Lindahl formulate a 
weighted measure of the strength of the network ties based on the order in which 
officials list other member states averaged across respondents.31 The dichotomous 
measure applied in the present study is simpler in that it does not involve an 
assumption about the association between the order of respondents’ answers and the 
strength of their network relations. To test the robustness of the results, we also ran 
the analyses with this weighted measure and with an unweighted measure averaged 
across respondents.  
 There is a broad tendency for member states to cooperate more closely with 
states that are geographically close to them, a pattern which is familiar from studies of 
coalition-building in the Council based on voting records and data on policy 
positions.32 Prior to the enlargement in 2004 the network relations in the Council 
working groups found in the data used here were structured primarily by a North-
South dimension. After the enlargement the North-South dimension was 
complemented by an East-West dimension. The geographical patterns are remarkably 
stable across policy areas (comparing foreign and security policy, agriculture and 
economic policy), Council hierarchy levels and over time. Larger states tend to have 
more network capital, i.e. access to more other states, than smaller states, although the 
correlation is weak.33 
                                   
31 Naurin and Lindahl 2008. 
32 Mattila 2008; AUTHOR. 
33 Naurin and Lindahl 2008. 
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 Policy positions, salience, capabilities and decision outcomes 
 
The data we use on actors’ initial policy positions, issue salience and decision 
outcomes are drawn from two studies. The first study gathered data on decision 
making in the EU-15.34 The second study applied a similar research design to gather 
data on decision making in the post-2004 EU. Both studies offer the same type of 
comparable and detailed information on controversial issues raised by legislative 
proposals. We match the network data to the relevant time period. 
 As suggested in the formulation of the network model, we conceive of 
political disagreement in terms of the distances between actors in policy spaces. 
Controversies raised by legislative proposals are conceptualized as issue continua or 
policy scales. The legislative proposal on payment services is one of the proposals 
examined in this study, on which five semi-structured interviews were held.35 The 
main issue raised by this proposal was the extent to which the huge market for 
providing payment services should be opened up to businesses other than banks. 
There was a fundamental disagreement, depicted in Figure 1, about the capital 
requirements, if any, that companies should have to fulfill in order to be allowed to 
provide payment services. At the left end of the issue continuum (position 0) we find 
the most liberal position, taken by the Commission and a group of member states led 
informally by the UK. These actors favored few restrictions on market entry. At the 
                                   
34 Thomson et al. eds. 2006. 
35 This proposal became Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 
97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC. 
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right end of the continuum (position 100), we find a group of states led informally by 
Germany, that favored tight restrictions on market entry in the form of high capital 
requirements. Intermediate positions are placed on positions between these two 
alternatives on a scale of 0-100, to reflect key informants’ judgments on the political 
distances between the alternatives. One such position was a compromise proposal, 
suggested by the Finnish delegation when it held the presidency. This compromise 
was judged to be half-way between the two opposing camps and placed on position 
50. The final outcome contained lower capital requirements than the Finnish proposal 
and is therefore somewhat closer to the Commission and UK’s position (position 40). 
This method of representing controversies spatially has been applied in a range of 
studies of decision making in national and international politics.36 
 
<FIGURE 1> 
 
 The selection consists of 93 legislative proposals, 89 of which have been 
decided on and can therefore be included in the present study (Table 1). 70 of the 
proposals are from the EU-15 period and 23 from the post-2004 period. Legislative 
proposals introduced by the Commission were selected for study according to three 
criteria: the time period, the type of legislative procedure and the level of political 
importance. Regarding the time period, each legislative proposal was on the Council’s 
agenda in the years 1999, 2000 or after the 2004 enlargement. Legislative proposals 
introduced up to December 2005 were included. Concerning the decision-making 
                                   
36 See, for example, Bueno de Mesquita 2003; Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman eds. 1994. 
Full details of the research design decisions for the EU-15 study can be found in Thomson 
and Stokman 2006. 
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procedure, the selected legislative proposals were subject to either the consultation or 
the codecision procedures, the two most commonly-used procedures. Regarding 
political importance, the selection was restricted to proposals on which there was an 
indication of at least some political importance and controversy. Each proposal was 
mentioned in news services covering European affairs: Agence Europe in the EU-15 
period or Agence Europe and European Voice in the post-2004 period. Furthermore, 
key informants had to identify at least one substantive disagreement between at least 
some of the actors. We included directives, regulations and decisions in the EU-15 
study, but excluded decisions from the post-2004 study. The effect of changing the 
new services and instruments in the post-2004 study was to focus the selection on 
more high-profile proposals. In the EU-15 study, we found that many of the proposals 
we had initially selected were highly technical and not controversial at all. The policy 
areas represented most prominently in the selection of EU-15 proposals are 
agriculture and internal market, each with 14 proposals, although fisheries (7 
proposals) and other policy areas are also present. Compared to the EU-15 study, the 
selection of proposals for the post-2004 study is more evenly distributed across 
different policy areas, including agriculture (five proposals), fisheries (three 
proposals), employment (two proposals), and environment (three proposals).37 As 
                                   
37 The 23 proposals included in the post-2004 study are sugar sector reform (CNS/2005/118), 
animal welfare (CNS/2005/009), agricultural fund (CNS/2004/161), CAP financing 
(CNS/2004/164), fisheries fund (CNS/2004/169), hake fish conservation (CNS/2003/318), 
conservation of fish in Biscay area (CNS/2003/327), the Regional Development Fund 
(COD/2004/167), including the general regulation of the Regional Development Fund 
(AVC/2004/163) also dealt with in the same codecision package, the working time directive 
(COD/2004/209), LIFE environmental programme (COD/2004/218), the European 
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reported in Table 1, we identified decision outcomes for almost all of the issues raised 
in the EU-15 selection, and for 57 of the 70 issues raised by the post-2004 proposals. 
The remaining issues from the post-2004 study are still pending. 
 
<TABLE 1> 
 
 Information on controversial issues and actors’ initial positions on these issues 
was collected in 263 semi-structured interviews with key informants (125 key 
informants in the EU-15 study and 138 informants in the post-2004 study). These 
interviews typically lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. The key informants were 
selected for their knowledge of the detail of the dossiers under investigation. Usually 
they were participants. We require detailed information on actors’ positions. This 
means our sources have to be close to the discussions. Individuals with different 
institutional affiliations were interviewed. The Commission officials interviewed (31 
in the EU-15 study and 17 in the post-2004 study) were usually responsible for 
drafting the proposals and monitoring the subsequent discussions. The officials from 
the permanent representations (69 in the EU-15 study and 80 in the post-2004 study) 
were usually the responsible desk officers. The individuals from the EP (4 in the EU-
                                                                                                    
Neighbourhood Instrument (COD/2004/219), port services (COD/2004/240), passengers with 
reduced mobility (COD/2005/007), data retention (COD/2005/182), waste (COD/2005/281), 
spirits (COD/2005/028), intellectual property rights (COD/2005/127), air pollution 
(COD/2005/183),pensions (COD/2005/214), broadcasting (COD/2005/260), payment 
services (COD/2005/245), Visa information system (COD/2004/287). 
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15 study and 41 in the post-2004 study) were either MEPs or their assistants.38 A 
further nine officials from the Council secretariat and twelve from interest groups 
were interviewed in the EU-15 study.  
 During these semi-structured interviews, each of the controversial issues was 
represented spatially, in the form of a policy scale ranging from 0 to 100 that 
represents the range of the bargaining space. Informants were free to specify as many 
issues they felt appropriate. However, usually two or three issues were sufficient to 
represent the controversies raised by a proposal. The informants’ estimates of the 
actors’ positions refer to the decision outcomes favored most by each of the actors at 
the time of the introduction of the Commission’s legislative proposal, or as soon as 
they took a position thereafter. The informants were also asked to estimate the level of 
importance each of the actors attached to each issue. This level of importance was 
estimated on a scale of 0-100, whereby a score of zero indicates that the issue was of 
no importance whatsoever, 50 that it had an ‘average’ level of importance to the actor 
concerned, and 100 that the issue could hardly be more important. The relations 
between the salience scores for different actors are more important than the absolute 
values of the scores. As with the procedures for estimating actors’ positions on 
controversial issues, the procedure for estimating issue salience was adapted from a 
widely-used procedure for decision analysis.39 When obtaining the judgments on 
actors’ positions and the levels of importance they attached to the issues, they were 
asked to substantiate their judgments extensively.  
                                   
38 A larger number of informants from the EP were interviewed in the post-2004 study. This 
was necessary because part of that study, that will be reported on elsewhere, examines the 
positions taken by actors within the EP. 
39 Bueno de Mesquita 2003, 598-602. 
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 Validity and reliability tests were conducted on the informants’ judgments. 
These tests consisted of comparing informants’ judgments with information from 
Council and EP documentation, and comparing judgments from different 
informants.40 These tests show that of all the points of discussion raised in the 
Council, key informants generally focus on issues that are more controversial, and 
that are more difficult to resolve. Informants’ estimates of the positions actors favored 
usually match information reported in Council documentation. When they differ, 
these differences are due to the fact that Council documents do not refer to policy 
preferences, but to the decision outcomes actors were prepared to accept during the 
course of the negotiations. In addition, König et al. compared 31 point estimates 
provided by key informants from the Council with estimates from informants in the 
European Parliament and found that 30 match perfectly or almost perfectly.41 
 Recall that the decision stage of the network model also incorporates actors’ 
capabilities when transforming their revised positions into the decision outcome. We 
posit that while the informal network relations are important during the influence 
stage, actors’ formal weights in the decision-making process are paramount at the 
final decision stage. We therefore apply a commonly used voting power index, the 
Banzhaf index.42 Given that this voting power index is based on actors’ formal 
                                   
40 Thomson 2006. 
41 König et al. 2007. 
42 Banzhaf 1965. Calculated using the voting power index calculator, Powerslave: Pajala, 
Meskanen and Kause 2002. Winning coalitions under the consultation procedure with QMV 
in the Council are assumed to consist of both a qualified majority of member states in the 
Council of ministers and the Commission or a unanimous Council: {CM(QMV), COM}, 
{CM(Unan.)}. Under consultation unanimity, winning coalitions consist of a unanimous 
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weights in the decision process, it attributes equal weight to the member states when 
the unanimity rule applies and weights that are roughly proportional to their qualified 
majority votes (QMV), when the QMV rule applies. The Commission also receives a 
positive voting power score when the consultation procedure applies combined with 
QMV in the Council. The European Parliament receives a positive voting power score 
when the co-decision rule applies. 
 
Analysis 
 
In the example of the controversy relating to the payment services directive illustrated 
in Figure 1 the network model generates a somewhat more accurate prediction of the 
actual decision outcome than does the baseline Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). 
According to the network model, the states that were calling for strong regulation of 
the payment services market moderated their positions as a consequence of their 
network ties with states that had more liberal positions. The states with liberal 
positions also shifted their positions according to the network model, but less than the 
states that wanted more regulation. On the basis of these revised positions, the 
                                                                                                    
Council only: {CM(Unan.)}. Under the codecision procedure with QMV in the Council, 
winning coalitions consist of both a qualified majority of member states in the Council of 
ministers and the European Parliament: {CM(QMV), EP}. Under codecision with unanimity 
in the Council, winning coalitions consist of a unanimous council and the EP: {CM(Unan.), 
EP}. The Bahnzhaf index gives lower power scores to the supranational institutions than the 
Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI; Shapley and Shubik 1954) using the same assumptions about 
winning coalitions (AUTHOR). These lower power scores are more appropriate given the 
prevailing inter-institutional power distribution in the EU (AUTHOR). 
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network model predicted that position 56 on the scale (rounded to the nearest whole 
number) would be the decision outcome, which is 16 points to the right of the actual 
outcome. On the basis of actors’ initial positions, the baseline NBS generates a 
prediction of point 61 on the scale, which gives it an absolute error of 21 scale points 
from the actual outcome.  
 The difference between the predictions made by the network model and the 
baseline NBS are not large, but it is statistically significant. This means that we may 
be able to identify which one is closest to the decision outcome, if indeed there is a 
systematic pattern in this regard. On average, the distance between the point 
predictions of the two models is 2.46 scale points (s.d.: 2.41; n=230). The 95 percent 
confidence interval for the mean difference between the point predictions of the two 
models ranges from 2.17 to 2.78. 
 The similarity between the predictions of the network model and the baseline 
NBS model is unsurprising given that the models have quite similar structures. The 
network model is in effect a variant of the NBS that incorporates the network 
structure among the member states. The advantage of this similarity is that any 
differences in model performance can be attributed to the inclusion of the network 
structure, rather than any other differences between the two models. 
 An appropriate procedure for testing the accuracy of model predictions is to 
examine the absolute distance between the point prediction of each model on each 
issue and the actual decision outcome.43 Table 2 contains information on the accuracy 
of the predictions of decision outcomes of both the network model and the baseline 
Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). The top right of this table shows that across all of 
the issues on which we currently have data on decision outcomes (230 controversial 
                                   
43 Achen 2006b. 
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issues), the network model has a mean average absolute error of 22.10 policy scale 
points. This is fractionally smaller than the mean error of the NBS at 22.81. The 
difference between these errors is however highly statistically significant as indicated 
by the non-parametric Wilcoxon test. The error of the network model is smaller than 
that of the NBS in 119 of the 215 issues. The error of the NBS is smaller than that of 
the network model in 86 of the issues, and the two models tie in 25 cases. Therefore, 
despite the similarity in the two models’ predictions, the network model’s predictions 
are consistently closer to the outcome than are the NBS’s predictions. 
 
 
<TABLE 2> 
 
  
 Table 2 also contains information on the differences between the models by 
different policy areas, decision procedures, and time periods. In general, the network 
model’s predictions are more accurate than those of the NBS in each sub-group of 
issues. We find the opposite pattern, whereby the average errors of the NBS are 
smaller than the errors of the network model, in only the 25 fisheries issues. However, 
in these 25 issues the errors of the network model are more frequently smaller than 
those of the NBS, as indicated by the negative z-scores.44 
                                   
44 We tested the robustness of the results by applying other versions of the network measure, 
weighted and averaged across respondents. With these alternative measures, the network 
model predicts smaller position shifts than with the dichotomous measure. Consequently, with 
these alternative measures the network model’s predictions of decision outcomes differ less 
from those of the baseline compromise model (NBS). Regardless of which measure that is 
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 If we compare the sub-groups of issues in Table 2, we find that the network 
model’s predictions are significantly more accurate than those of the baseline model 
when we have a relatively large number of observations with which to detect these 
differences. In each of the three largest sub-groups of issues, the tests indicate that the 
network model significantly improves on the predictive accuracy of the NBS: the 93 
issues in the ‘other’ policy areas category, the 83 issues subject to codecision and 
QMV in the Council, and the 173 issues from the EU-15 study. The simplest 
explanation for finding significant differences in these sub-groups of cases is that 
there is more statistical power with which to detect such differences.45 The ‘other’ 
policy area category consists of a large number of policy areas, each of which 
contains a small number of observations, including environment, health, culture, 
transport and education. Given the similar structures of the network model and the 
baseline model, and consequently their similar predictions, we need a substantial 
number of cases to detect significant differences in their predictive accuracy.  
 
Conclusions 
                                                                                                    
used, however, the network model’s predictions are always more often closer to the actual 
outcomes than are the baseline model’s predictions, indicated by the negative z-scores in all 
the tests. 
45 Table 2 contains 12 bivariate tests, five of which are statistically significant at the p<.05 
level. Arguably, one would expect to find a statistically significant difference between two 
groups in a sample at the p<.05 level in one in every twenty tests, even if no difference 
existed in the population. One Bonferonni correction would multiply the p-values by the 
number of tests to obtain a more accurate estimation of the probability of a Type I error. If 
this procedure were applied, then the difference between model performance in all 230 cases 
would still be significant (p of .003 * 12 = .036). 
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 The network model predicts shifts in actors’ policy positions as a consequence of the 
relationships in which they are embedded. In our application of this model to decision 
making in the European Union, state representatives shift their policy positions due to 
the influence exerted on them by other states with which they have network ties. Our 
main finding is that the network model generates significantly more accurate 
predictions of decision outcomes than does the baseline Nash Bargaining Solution. 
This baseline model has a formidable track record in predicting the outcomes of 
decision making in the EU, as evident in previous studies in which its predictive 
power was compared to that of more complex models. Consequently, our main 
finding is striking evidence of the importance of taking network relations into account 
when formulating models of decision making in international politics.  
 Our test of the impact of network relations was a particularly tough one 
because our model does not allow these relations to influence actors’ initial policy 
positions. The network model assumes that states’ initial policy positions are 
formulated prior to their contacts with other states. According to the network model, 
states’ network ties influence the development of these initial positions before the 
formal decision stage. Previous qualitative research on how state representatives 
formulate their initial policy positions in the EU suggests that this is a defendable 
assumption. Nonetheless, it is certainly a simplification, and future research may be 
directed toward the investigation of how networks affect the formation of states’ 
initial policy positions, as well as their policy positions after negotiations.  
 The findings add nuance to our understanding of the process of decision 
making in the EU. Decision making in the EU is certainly inclusive in the sense that 
the positions of all actors appear to be reflected in decision outcomes to some extent. 
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Previous research has shown that models that incorporate information on the policy 
positions of all actors, such as the baseline NBS applied here, generate relatively 
accurate predictions of decision outcomes. By contrast, models that incorporate 
information on the positions of only subsets of actors, such as the positions of the 
agenda setter and the pivotal actor, generally make less accurate predictions of 
decision outcomes. While our findings are consistent with this general insight, they 
indicate that some states’ positions matter more than others with respect to the 
influence they exert on other states through their network relations. This clarifies the 
nature of the network relations we encounter in the EU. Analysts of some other 
political systems have observed that policy networks may be used to alert like-minded 
actors of the need to take action on an issue, rather than to change the policy positions 
of other actors. While networks in the EU may also be used for this, the evidence we 
present suggests that actors use their networks to shift other states’ initial policy 
positions. Consequently, a model that incorporates network relations generates more 
accurate predictions of decision outcomes. 
 The resource that actors derive from their network relations has been referred 
to as their network capital. States differ markedly from each other in terms of their 
network capital, even in a highly-institutionalized international system such as the 
EU. In the EU, there is evidence that the network capital empowers some small and 
medium-sized states to a greater extent than might be expected on the basis of their 
population sizes or economic resources. While large states do tend to have more 
network influence over others, the distribution of network capital is not associated 
with size in a linear fashion. While Germany, the United Kingdom and France have 
large stocks of network capital, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark have more 
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network capital than do Spain and Italy.46 Thus, it appears that the distribution of 
informal power resources is advantageous to at least some small and medium-sized 
states, and disadvantageous to some large states. To a certain extent, this is consistent 
with the formal institutions of the EU that feature a degressive proportionality, 
whereby large states have more weight than small states but not in proportion to the 
differences among their population sizes. 
 The present study is one of the first steps toward the systematic incorporation 
of networks in the study of international politics. The network model proposed here is 
very similar in structure to the baseline model. This similarity had the advantage of 
holding constant the basic model structure, thereby enabling us to gauge the effect of 
including information on networks. Since the results indicate that the inclusion of 
networks improves the predictive power of the baseline model, future research might 
incorporate networks into more sophisticated models of decision making. At present, 
most models of bargaining in international politics, in both the cooperative and non-
cooperative traditions, assume at least implicitly that each actor has unfettered access 
to all other actors. Network analysis can replace this unrealistic assumption with 
measures of the relationships in which actors are embedded and theories of how these 
relationships affect their behavior. 
   
  
                                   
46 Naurin and Lindahl 2008. 
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Tables and figures 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of selected proposals (in parentheses are the numbers of cases with decision 
outcomes) 
Study EP 
involve
ment 
Council 
voting 
rule 
Legislative 
proposals 
selected by 
researchers 
Issues 
identified by 
experts 
Type of 
instrument 
Legislative 
proposals 
Issues 
EU-15 COD QMV 23 (23) 63 (62)    
  Unan. 5 (5) 12 (12) Directives 30 (30) 78 (77) 
 CNS QMVa 22 (22) 55 (55) Regulations 33 (33) 79 (79) 
  Unan. 20 (20) 44 (44) Decisions 7 (7) 17 (17) 
Total   70 (70) 174 (173)  70 (70) 174 (173) 
        
COD QMV 12 (9) 30 (21)    
 Unan. 4 (3) 16 (12) Directives 10 (6) 32 (19) 
Post-
2004 
EU CNS QMV 6 (6) 20 (20) Regulations 13 (13) 38 (38) 
  Unan. 1 (1) 4 (4) Decisions - - 
Total   23 (19) 70 (57)  23 (19) 70 (57) 
Note: COD: codecision; CNS: consultation. a: contains one legislative proposal with two issues 
(CNS/1999/192 on the Employment Committee) that required the support of a QMV and ten member 
states to pass. 
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Table 2. Errors of network model compared to baseline Nash Bargaining Solution under 
different conditions 
 Policy areas  
 Agriculture 
(n = 52) 
Fisheries 
(n=25) 
Internal 
Market 
(n=37) 
Justice and 
Home Affairs  
(n=23) 
 
Other 
(n=93) 
All 
(n=230) 
Network 
model 
25.39 
(21.06) 
18.66 
(14.74) 
27.31 
(18.93) 
23.72 
(26.25) 
18.71 
(17.84) 
22.10 
(19.62) 
NBS 
baseline 
25.99 
(21.70) 
18.45 
(14.42) 
28.27 
(20.05) 
23.98 
(26.58) 
19.73 
(18.53) 
22.81 
(20.22) 
z-score -1.10 -0.60 -1.33 -0.45 -3.08*** -3.00*** 
  
Decision procedures 
  
 Consultation 
QMV 
(n=75) 
Consultation 
unanimity 
(n=48) 
Co-decision 
QMV 
(n=83) 
Co-decision 
unanimity 
(n=24) 
  
Network 
model 
23.36 
(19.92) 
17.78 
(19.70) 
22.72 
(19.10) 
24.67 
(20.29) 
  
NBS 
baseline 
23.66 
(20.39) 
18.72 
(19.72) 
23.71 
(20.35) 
25.20 
(20.38) 
  
z-score -0.89 -1.77* -2.28** -.82   
  
Before/after 2004 enlargement 
   
 Before 
(n=173) 
After 
(n=57) 
    
Network 
model 
22.66 
(20.33) 
20.41 
(17.35) 
    
NBS 
baseline 
23.49 
(21.07) 
20.72 
(17.39) 
    
z-score -2.79*** -1.06     
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Negative z-scores from Wilcoxon signed ranks test indicate 
that errors of the network model are more often lower than errors of the NBS baseline than vice versa.  
*p≤0.10, **p≤0.05, ***p≤0.01 (two-tailed). 
 
 
 
 What capital requirements, if any, should be set for companies that provide payment 
services? 
Figure 1. Initial Positions of the Actors on Payment Services Controversy 
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